Ford Fuel System Crashworthiness

Although fires occur in only about three out of every one thousand automobile collisions, each year thousands of people sustain disfiguring or fatal burn injuries in post-collision fires.  Many of these can be attributed to dangerous and defective fuel system designs, which are subject to compromise or failure in the event of a collision.  Safer fuel systems have been economically available for more than 30 years, but as a result of efforts by Ford Motor Company and other manufacturers to avoid implementing alternative designs, there are still tens of thousands of vehicles on the nation's highways with defective and hazardous fuel systems. 

Vehicles continue to be sold with designs that have for decades been criticized as unsafe by design experts and the automotive industry itself.

Ford's 'Callous Indifference'

Early efforts of the government to impose automotive fuel system crash safety standards were met with resistance by Ford and other auto manufacturers.  On November 1970, Ford opposed strengthening of the federal fuel tank safety standard (FMVSS 301) while its own safety engineers were urging in an internal memo that "technology should be developed to provide rupture protection for the fuel tank for 30 mph side and rear impacts."

As early as 30 years ago, Ford clearly knew how to solve many of the problems of poor fuel system designs, using "shields" and "bladders" or "flak suits" to protect fuel tanks from being ruptured.  Ford's internal documents (Fuel System Integrity Program-Financial Review - April 22, 1971 and Corporate Fuel System Integrity Objectives - April 26, 1971) clearly show that Ford chose to delay the implementation of design improvements relating to fuel system safety.

In 1973, as the federal government was seeking to strengthen its safety standard mandating fuel system integrity in crashes, Ford was busy making calculations of its own.  This cost-benefit analysis was prepared by Ford environmental and safety engineers in 1973, estimating it would cost $11 per vehicle to protect fuel tanks from rupturing in rollover crashes:

Evidence of this type provided the basis for punitive damages claims in product liability actions.  In Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Company (1981) 119 Cal. App. 3d 757 a crashworthiness case involving a 1972 Pinto hatchback, the jury rendered a substantial punitive damages award against the manufacturer.  On appeal, Ford contended that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of malice.  The California appellate court disagreed, stating:

"Through the results of the crash tests Ford knew that the Pinto's fuel tank and rear structure would expose consumers to serious injury or death in a 20 to 30 mile per hour collision.  There was evidence that Ford could have corrected the hazardous design defects at minimal cost but decided to defer correction of the shortcomings by engaging in a cost-benefit analysis balancing human lives and limbs against corporate profits.  Ford's institutional mentality was shown to be one of callous indifference to public safety.  There was substantial evidence that Ford's conduct constituted ‘conscious disregard' of the probability of injury to members of the consuming public." (119 Cal. App. 3d at 813)

Since Grimshaw, there have been other successful fuel system crashworthiness cases against Ford, where juries have awarded punitive damages based upon similar evidence. (Ford Motor Company v. Stubblefield 171 G.App. 331 (1984)), Ford Motor Company v. Durrill 714 S.W. 2d 329 (Tex.App. - Corpus Christi 1986)).

The Right Way, The Wrong Way Here are four important, life-saving considerations automotive engineers should be making as they design fuel systems for the motoring public: 1. Location If the tank is behind the axle, it is located in the crush zone, thereby increasing the potential for deformation of the tank in a collision.  Another dangerous design is the drop-in tank, a tank which is situated such that the top of the tank is part of the floor of the trunk.  As the vehicle crushes there will inevitably be deformation of the tank.  Safe tank location requires not only placing the tank in a protected area, but isolation of the tank as much as possible from energy absorbing structures and portions of the vehicle which are designed to deform in a collision. Tank location is also critical in side impact crashworthiness, particularly in cases involving fuel tanks mounted outside the frame rails.  This location, referred to as the saddle tank design, leaves the tank vulnerable to impact with only relatively flimsy sheet metal between the tank and the impacting vehicle.

2. Hostile Environment A tank may be located in an ideal position from the standpoint of protection from impact deformation or puncture from exterior sources, but if it is surrounded by interior components there may be an increased and unnecessary risk of compromise.  Adjacent components such as bolts, brackets, springs, mounting straps and flanges can easily puncture a tank if they are moved toward the tank by collision deformation, or if the tank is pushed into the components. There are inexpensive fixes for this type of defect, including changing the shape of the components or eliminating sharp edges in order to distribute impact loads over broader areas.  If the part cannot be readily altered or relocated, metal or plastic shields can be placed between the tank and the hazardous component.

3. Component Attachment Failure
A frequent source of fuel spillage in many post-collision fires is leakage from areas where components have become separated or  detached.  The primary situation is filler neck pull-out.  The filler neck, which is the tube through which fuel is fed into the tank, is often placed in a configuration whereby it can be easily pulled away from the tank by sheet metal or structural members which are shifted relative to the tank in the course of a collision.  If this pull-out occurs, a gaping hole is left where fuel pours from the tank.  Also, damage to the filler neck can cause fuel leakage, and certain designs in the past have incorporated weak plastic tubes as well as weak attachment hardware.

There are a variety of safer alternate designs such as longer filler pipes, which allow greater movement without complete disconnection from the tank.  Other design features include breakaway filler necks, flexible pipes which deform without pulling out or puncturing, and improved sealing methods which reduce the risk of failure. 4. Passenger Compartment Protection Aside from the issue of protecting fuel system components themselves from damage in a collision, related theories of liability may involve insufficient protection of vehicle occupants.  If a fuel system has been compromised by impact forces, defective design features of the vehicle structure may enhance injury potential.  Inadequate separation between the passenger compartment and the fuel tank can allow fuel and fire to quickly enter the passenger compartment, thus depriving occupants of sufficient escape time.

Some manufacturers utilize metal bulkheads to separate the fuel tank area from the passenger compartment.  Despite the fact that long ago engineers recognized the need for a "fire wall" behind the rear seat back,  some manufacturers have used nothing more than seat cushions between the passenger compartment and the fuel tank.

Conclusion

Fuel system safety has come a long way since the days of the Ford Pinto.  Forced by FMVSS 301 and by pressure from product liability litigation, the industry has reluctantly responded by adopting designs which could and should have been adopted decades ago.  However, FMVSS 301 remains only a minimal standard.  It covers only a small fraction of the broad spectrum of foreseeable and probable collision circumstances and speeds.  Consequently, many new vehicles which meet the standard are nevertheless unreasonably dangerous, and utilize defective designs which create an extreme risk of injury or death from fire.

(07/27/00)